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we e xpect network users to learn over time that contribution provides many benefits over free-r iding. The need for Louis Vuitton UK the reward and punishment mechanism arises not only when a user observes an increase in free riders. A. The result is consistent with the approach taken in prior experimental studies but contradictory to Kandori 1992 ??s suggestion that enforcement of social norm is itself a public good. We also find that network users respond differe ntly to different contributor groups. 2004. Who??s really sharing? Effects of social and expert status on knowledge exchange within groups. these individual characteristics largely stay unchanged over time. E. Moreover. 2004. References Alexander. file louis vuitton outlet servers are set to provide access to all users by default. Thaler. B. It also shows that user-initiated social enforcement mechanisms could play a significant role in sustaining peer-to-peer networks. Journal of Economic Perspective 14 3 137-158. H7b: Social Enforcement ?C a contributor??s probability of providing preferential Louis vuitton to other contributors decreases when she observes an increase in contributors in a peer-to-peer network. Second. The increase is consistent with the finding from economic experiments and Figure 1. Casadesus- Masanell.. The need for using such a reward and punishment mechanism is at the greatest when the network is overwhelmed with free riders and at the lowest when the network has a sufficient number of contributors. 2005.. Towards an Integration of Agent and Activity- Centric Approaches in Organizational Process Modeling: Incorporating Incentive Mechanisms. B. The Economic Journal 111 468 51-68. By punishing or threatening to punish perpetrators who do not comply with social norms. 2005 . Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and et hnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies . For example. on average. followed by a discussion of the empirical analysis and results. 2003. and S.. a contributor is more likely to change her server st atus to punish free Louis vuitton uk when she faces longer download wait time as long wait time indicates the need to encourage contribution behavior H8 . extrinsic. Herbsleb. trust games. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Saroiu. While we do not observe these variables in our peer-to-peer network. A. Louis Vuitton Outlet Shah. Moreover. In either case. reciprocity depends on contributors?? needs. we do not observe all server stat us data since the provision of such data is voluntary. 2006 . Milinski. 17 1 45?C63. The need for using such a reward and punishment mechanism is at the greatest when the network is overwhelmed with free riders and at the lowest when the network has a sufficient number of contributors. 2001 . Smith. For example. First. and moral hazard. and open-source development communities Hann et al. indicating that the multicollinearity problem is not severe e nough to affect the regression results. G. wh ich would either positively or ne gatively influence her future contribution behavior. on average. and S.g. G. J. 2005 . S. Thaler. Second. G. Henrich. First. J. The result is consistent with the approach taken in prior experimental studies but contradictory to Kandori 1992 ??s suggestion that enforcement of social norm is itself a public good. Telang. Wasko and Faraj 2000 find through surveys that individuals are motiv ated by indirect reciprocity in making contributions to online 6 communities.-G. and S. 1995. 2007b. The advent of online marketplace makes indir ect reciprocity an important consideration Novak and Sigmund 2005 . The design prevents one-to-one interactions. H. The kindness of strangers: The usefulness of electronic weak ties for technical advice. H3: Experience?C a user??s probability of contribution increases with her experience with the peer-to-peer network. 1988. individuals in these networks often infer contributor intention and needs from contributors?? downloading and uploading activities.g. in a trust game. R. M. B. Thaler. Most of motivation mechanisms are derived based on the assumption that individuals are self-interested economic decision makers. A. Fehr. American Economic Review 90 1 247-264. 2007. Lerner. 2001a. Our analysis also reveals that reputation and social enforcement have significant influences on an individual contribution probability H4 and H5 . and cooperation. Our goal is to understand how changes in the envi ronment of the peer-to-peer network influence individuals making contributions to the network and enforcing social norms. Fixed effect: Individual characteristics such culture background. and M. Telang. A. NV. Journal of Business 59 4 S285?CS300.. An individual has a higher propensity to contribu te if she faces longer wait time and needs to download a large number of files from the p eer- to-peer network. contributors decide whether and how much to contribute but not who to receive the contribution. Indirect reciprocity in this case makes individuals behave as ??conditional cooperators?? Ostrom 2000 . We. Falking et al 2002 . Management Science 52 7 984-999. M. Herbsleb. D. J. In the context of social networks. D. On the other hand. Shah 2006. Public Choice 86 1-2 117-135. S. louis vuitton outlet impartiality to invoke fairness in the n-pd: Some experimental results.. the enforcement of social norms is inherent in human behavior and does not require extrinsic incentive to enforce. we can isolate social influence from individual variations. Instead.. Hardin. 2004. Y.. contributions o f digital contents could significantly slow down the contributor??s network connection and delay or disrupt software applications that share the same network connection. Handbook of Experimental Economics. This is consistent with the hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 3 817-868. M. Agres. Stallaert. A Market Design for Grid Computing. 1988. Zmud. On indirect reciprocity the dis tinction between reciprocity and altruism. Fehr. Emerson. we focus on changes in individual contribution behavior and identi fy how social environments influence such changes. E. M.